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Abstract
In order to secure communications between two clients with a trusted server’s help in public net-
work environments, a three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (3PAKE) scheme
is used to provide the transaction confidentiality and efficiency. In 2010, Lou-Huang proposed a
new simple three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (LH-3PAKE) scheme based
on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). By analysis, Lou-Huang claimed that the proposed LH-
3PAKE scheme is not only secure against various attacks, but also more efficient than previously
proposed 3PAKE schemes. However, this paper demonstrates LH-3PAKE scheme is vulnerable
to off-line password guessing attacks by an attacker.
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1. Introduction
Password-based authenticated key exchange scheme has been accepted as one of the simplest
and most convenient authentication mechanisms in a network environment to protect unautho-
rized access to a networked system. Many Internet applications are based on password authen-
tication, for example, remote login, government organizations, private corporations, database
management systems, and school systems. Bellovin and Merritt [1] were the first to consider
how two parties, who only share a weak, low-entropy password and who are communicating
over a public network, authenticate each other and agree on a high-entropy cryptographic key
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to be used for protecting their subsequent communication. While two-party password-based au-
thenticated key exchange (2PAKE) schemes are well suited for client-server architectures, they
are inconvenient and costly for use in large scale peer to peer systems. Since 2PAKE protocols
require each pair of potential communicating parties to share a password, a large number of
parties result in an even larger number of passwords shared.
Recently, various three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (3PAKE) schemes
were proposed [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14] to solve problems of two-party password-
based authenticated key exchange (2PAKE) schemes which keeps a large number of secrets for
communicating with a group of users. In the 3PAKE schemes, a trusted server assists each pair
of users to authenticate each other and share a session key. In addition, the user does not need to
keep a large number of secrets for a group of users. With the server’s help, each user only shares
one secret with the server in 3PAKE protocols. The main advantage of 3PAKE scheme is that
it requires each user only to remember a single password with the trusted server. Consequently,
3PAKE schemes can limit the number of passwords that each user must memorize. This seems
to be a more practical scenario in the real world than two-party PAKE solutions. However, the
server has to participate during the protocol run to help the two users share a session key.
Since users usually choose easy-to-remember passwords, PAKE schemes can be vulnerable
to password guessing attacks [12, 15]. Unlike typical private keys, the password has limited
entropy, and is constrained by the memory of the user. For example, one alphanumerical char-
acter has 6 bits of entropy, and thus the goal of the attacker, which is to obtain a legitimate
communication party’s password, can be achieved within a reasonable time. Therefore, the pass-
word guessing attacks on PAKE schemes should be considered a real possibility. In general, the
password guessing attacks can be divided into three classes [12, 15]:
• Detectable on-line password guessing attacks: an attacker attempts to use a guessed pass-
word in an on-line transaction. He/she verifies the correctness of his/her guess using the
response from server. A failed guess can be detected and logged by the server.
• Undetectable on-line password guessing attacks: similar to above, an attacker tries to ver-
ify a password guess in an online transaction. However, a failed guess cannot be detected
and logged by the server, as the server cannot distinguish between an honest request and
an attacker’s request.
• Off-line password guessing attacks: an attacker guesses a password and verifies his/her
guess off-line. No participation of server is required, so the server does not notice the
attack as a malicious one.
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) can achieve the same level of security with smaller key
size compared with Diffie-Hellman key agreement [16] or the RSA cryptography system [17].
For example, it has been shown that 160-bit ECC provides comparable security to 1024-bit RSA
and 224-bit ECC provides comparable security to 2048-bit RSA [18, 19, 20, 21]. Hence, under
the same security level, smaller key sizes of ECC offer merits of the computational efficiency, as
well as memory, and bandwidth saving. It is better suited for resource constrained devices, such
as smart cards or mobile units.
In 2010, Lou-Huang [21] proposed a new simple three-party password-based authenticated
key exchange (LH-3PAKE) scheme based on ECC. By analysis, Lou-Huang claimed that the
proposed LH-3PAKE scheme is not only secure against various attacks, but also more efficient
than previously proposed 3PAKE schemes [8]. Actually, the proposed LH-3PAKE scheme is
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Table 1: Notation used in LH-3PAKE scheme
A, B Two identity numbers of clients (users)
TS Trusted server (remote server)
pwA Password shared between user A and TS
pwB Password shared between user B and TS
Eq Elliptic curve
P Generator of the group with order n of at least 160 bits
d Private key of TS
F = dP Public key of TS
h(·) Public one-way hash function
⊕ Bitwise exclusive-or (XOR) operation
suitable for hardware-limited users, such as the limited memory or lower computation capacity,
because the ECC can achieve the same level of security with smaller key size. Nevertheless, this
paper demonstrates LH-3PAKE scheme is vulnerable to off-line password guessing attacks by
an attacker [12, 15, 22].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We subsequently review LH-3PAKE
scheme in Section 2. The off-line password guessing attacks on LH-3PAKE scheme are presented
in Section 3. Finally, we draw conclusions in Section 4.
2. Review of LH-3PAKE Scheme
This section briefly review LH-3PAKE scheme [21]. Table 1 details the notation used. Before
running the scheme, the trusted server first chooses a large prime number q(q ≈ 2160) and an
elliptic curve Eq (the elliptic curve E is over the finite field Fq); a cyclic group G =< P > of
points over the elliptic curve Eq, where P is the generator of the group and has an order n of at
least 160 bits. It provides nP = O and its point at infinity is O.
Assume that two clients A and B wish to construct a common session key. They cannot
directly authenticate each other since they do not hold any shared information beforehand. They
have to resort to the trusted server TS for a session key agreement. Fig. 1 depicts the LH-3PAKE
scheme, which involves the following six steps:
1. A → B: (A, ZA, FA)
User A chooses a random number ta and computes two points QA = taP = (QAx,QAy) and
FA = taF = ta(dP) = d(taP) = dQA over the elliptic curve Eq, where QAx and QAy are
the x-component and y-component of point QA, respectively. Then, A sends (A, ZA, FA) to
user B, where ZA = (QAx||QAy) ⊕ h(pwA, A, B).
2. B → TS : (A, ZA, FA, B, ZB, FB)
User B also selects a random number tb and computes two points QB = tbP = (QBx,QBy)
and FB = tbF = tb(dP) = d(tbP) = dQB over the elliptic curve Eq, where QBx and
QBy are the x-component and y-component of point QB, respectively. Next, B forwards
(A, ZA, FA, B, ZB, FB) to the trusted serve TS , where ZB = (QBx||QBy) ⊕ h(pwB, A, B).
3. TS → B: (RA,RB)
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Upon receiving (A, ZA, FA, B, ZB, FB), TS first uses pwA and pwB to derive two points
QA = ZA ⊕ h(pwA, A, B) and QB = ZB ⊕ h(pwB, A, B); and then computes two points
F′A = dQA = d(taP) and F
′
B = dQB = d(tbP) over Eq. Then, TS checks whether F
′
A = FA
and F′B = FB hold or not. If any of the conditions does not hold, TS will terminate this
request for a period of time. Otherwise the trusted server TS chooses a random number t
and uses the passwords pwA and pwB to compute two points RA = t(pwA)QA = t(pwA)(taP)
and RB = t(pwB)QB = t(pwB)(tbP) over the elliptic curve Eq . Next, TS sends (RA,RB) to
user B.
Shared Information: A, B, F = dP, Eq, P, Z∗p, h(·).
Information held by A: A, pwA.
Information held by B: B, pwB.
Information held by TS : S , d, pwA, pwB.
User A User B Trusted Server TS
ta ∈ Z∗p
QA = taP
FA = taF
ZA = (QAx ||QAy) ⊕ h(pwA, A, B)
A, ZA, FA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
tb ∈ Z∗p
QB = tbP
FB = tbF
ZB = (QBx ||QBy) ⊕ h(pwB, A, B)
A, ZA, FA, B, ZB, FB−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
QA = ZA ⊕ h(pwA, A, B)
QB = ZB ⊕ h(pwB, A, B)
Verify FA
?
= dQA
Verify FB
?
= dQB
t ∈ Z∗p
RA = t(pwA)QA = t(pwA)(taP)
RB = t(pwB)QB = t(pwB)(tbP)
RA,RB←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
K = tb(pwB)RA
S B = h(Kx, Ky, B)
RB, S B←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
K = ta(pwA)RB
Verify S B
?
= h(Kx, Ky, B)
S A = h(Kx, Ky, A)
S A−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Verify S A
?
= h(Kx, Ky, A)
Shared session key between A and B: K = ttatb pwApwBP
Figure 1: LH-3PAKE scheme
4. B → A: (RB, S B)
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When B receives (RA,RB), he/she uses the random number tb and his/her password pwB to
compute the common key (point) K = tb(pwB)RA = tb(pwB)t(pwA)(taP) = (Kx, Ky) over
Eq and S B = h(Kx, Ky, B). Here, Kx and Ky are the x-component and y-component of point
K, respectively. And user B forwards (RB, S B) to user A.
5. A→ B: (S A)
After receiving (RB, S B), user A uses the random number ta and his/her password pwA
to derive K = ta(pwA)RB = ta(pwA)t(pwB)(tbP) = (Kx, Ky). Then, A checks whether
S B = h(Kx, Ky, B) holds or not. If it does not hold, A terminates the protocol. Otherwise,
K is a valid session key. Then, A computes S A = h(Kx, Ky, A) and sends it to user B.
6. Upon receiving S A, user B verifies whether S A = h(Kx, Ky, A) holds or not. If it does not
hold, B terminates the protocol. Otherwise, K is a valid session key and TS is a real trusted
server. Both users A and B can use this session key K for a secure communication. Here,
K is only used for one session.
For security, the random numbers ta and tb for users A and B are only used once.
3. Cryptanalysis of LH-3PAKE Scheme
This section shows that LH-3PAKE scheme is not secure to off-line password guessing at-
tacks [12, 15, 22]. First, we define the security term needed for security problem analysis of the
LH-3PAKE scheme as follows:
Definition 1. A weak secret (password pwi) is a value of low entropy Weak(k), which can be
guessed in polynomial time.
3.1. Off-line password guessing attack
The off-line password guessing attack scenario is outlined in Fig. 2. Let E be a malicious
attacker mediating between B and TS . Then, the malicious attacker E can perform the following
“off-line password guessing attack”.
1. A→ B: (A, ZA, FA)
2. B→ E(TS ): (A, ZA, FA, B, ZB, FB)
When B sends (A, ZA, FA, B, ZB, FB) to TS , E intercepts the message.
3. E → B: (R∗A,R∗B)
Without any help of TS , B chooses e ∈ Z∗p randomly. B then computes R∗A = eP and lets
R∗B = R
∗
A. Finally, E sends (R
∗
A,R
∗
B) to B.
4. B→ E(A): (R∗B, S B)
Upon receiving (R∗A,R
∗
B) from E, B will use the random number tb and his/her password
pwB to compute the common key (point) K = tb(pwB)RA = tb(pwB)eP = (pwB)eQB over
Eq and S B = h(Kx, Ky, B). Here, Kx and Ky are the x-component and y-component of
point K, respectively. Finally, the user B will forward (R∗B, S B) to user A. At this time, E
intercepts the message (R∗B, S B).
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5. By using the intercepted R∗B and ZB, B guesses a password pw
∗
B and computes Q
∗
B = ZB ⊕
h(pw∗B, A, B) and K
∗ = (pw∗B)eQ
∗
B. B then checks if ZA
?
= h(pw∗A, X ⊕ h(pw∗A, A, B)). If the
check passes, then B confirms that the guessed password pw∗A is the correct one.
6. If it is not correct, B chooses another password pw∗B and repeatedly performs above step
(5) until S B
?
= h(K∗x , K∗y , B).
User A User B Attacker E
A, ZA, FA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
tb ∈ Z∗p
QB = tbP
FB = tbF
ZB = (QBx ||QBy) ⊕ h(pwB, A, B)
A, ZA, FA, B, ZB, FB−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Intercept (A, ZA, FA, B, ZB, FB)
Choose e ∈ Z∗p
Compute R∗A = eP
Let R∗B = RA
R∗A,R
∗
B←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
K = tb(pwB)RA = tb(pwB)eP = (pwB)eQB
S B = h(Kx, Ky, B)
R∗B, S B←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Attacker E
Intercept (R∗B, S B)
Perform Off-line password guessing attack 1 (ZB,R∗B, A, B, D) {
for i := 0 to |D| {
Guess pw∗B ← D;
Compute Q∗B = ZB ⊕ h(pw∗B, A, B);
Compute K∗ = (pw∗B)eQ
∗
B;
if S B == h(K∗x , K∗y , B) then return pw∗B
}
}
Figure 2: Off-line password guessing attack
3.2. Real applications for the proposed password guessing attacks
In the modern life which the Internet has strong influence to people, passwords are the most
common means of user authentication on the Internet. For practical applications, password-
based authentication protocols are required when making use of Internet network services like
E-learning, on-line polls, on-line ticket-order systems, roll call systems, on-line games, etc. Sup-
pose that the password pwA of user A can be revealed by the attacker due to the above described
password guessing attacks. In real applications, users offer the same password as above to access
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several application servers for their convenience. Thus, an attacker may try to use the guessed
password pwA to impersonate the user A to login to other systems that the user A has registered
with outside this LH-3PAKE protocol-based server. If the targeted outside server adopts the nor-
mal authentication protocol, it is possible that the attacker can successfully impersonate the user
A to login to it by using the guessed password pwA. Therefore, the password breach cannot be
revealed by the attacker’s actions.
4. Conclusions
Three-party authenticated key exchange technology has been widely deployed in various
kinds of applications. Recently, Lou-Huang proposed a new simple three-party password-based
authenticated key exchange (LH-3PAKE) scheme based on ECC. However, we have demon-
strated that LH-3PAKE scheme still falls prey to off-line password guessing attacks by an at-
tacker. For this reason, LH-3PAKE scheme is insecure for practical application. It is important
that security engineers should be made aware of this, if they are responsible for the design and
development of three-party password-based authenticated key exchange systems.
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